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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In February 2014, 24-year-old Charles Clarke was traveling through 
the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport, returning to 
Florida after visiting relatives.1  He was carrying a large amount of cash—
$11,000—, which he normally kept at home due to a lack of bank branches 
in his area, and which he had taken with him to Ohio because he did not 
want it getting lost in a family move.2  The cash, he said, came “from 
financial aid, various jobs, gifts from family, and educational benefits 
based on his mother’s status as a disabled veteran.”3  As he was about to 
board the plane, members of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
Task Force seized the money.4  While Clarke did not have anything illegal 
in his possession, “the task force officers reasoned that the cash was the 
proceeds of drug trafficking, because Clarke was traveling on a recently-
purchased one-way ticket, he was unable to provide documentation of 
where the money came from, and they claimed his checked baggage had 
an odor of marijuana.”5  Despite not having proved he was guilty or even 
                                                          
*  Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; 
B.A., B.S., The University of California, Berkeley.  The Author would like to thank Texas Tech 
University School of Law for its generous support of this Article.  He would also like to thank Becky 
Jaffe, Professor Erin Archerd, Professor Lauren Newell, Professor Michael Moffitt, Professor Nancy 
Welsh, and the participants in the Marquette AALS ADR Works in Progress Conference for their 
thoughts, support, ideas, or comments. 
 1.  Christopher Ingraham, Drug Cops Took a College Kid’s Savings and Now 13 Police 
Departments Want a Cut, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/30/drug-cops-took-a-college-kids-life-
savings-and-now-13-police-departments-want-a-cut/?utm_term=.b1eccf584430; INST. FOR JUST., 
Ordinary Americans Are Victims of Policing for Profit in Our Nation’s Airports, 
http://ij.org/case/kentucky-civil-forfeiture/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Victims of 
Policing]. 
 2.  Victims of Policing, supra note 1. 
 3.  DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL 
ASSET FORFEITURE 8 (2d ed. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-
edition.pdf. 
 4.  Ingraham, supra note 1. 
 5.  Id.  Clarke was a marijuana smoker, but the officer did not find any drugs or any other illegal 
items on Clarke or in his luggage.  Id. 
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suspected of a crime, law enforcement officers were able to keep his 
money.6 
In April 2015, Joseph Rivers was traveling on an Amtrak train from 
Dearborn, Michigan, to Los Angeles, California, to make a music video.7  
Rivers had $16,000 in cash with him, which he said came from savings as 
well as money donated from his mother and other relatives.8  He carried 
the money in cash because he “had problems in the past with taking out 
large sums of money from out-of-state banks.”9  In Albuquerque, a DEA 
agent boarded the train and began “asking various passengers, including 
Rivers, where they were going and why.  When Rivers replied that he was 
headed to [Los Angeles] to make a music video, the agent asked to search 
his bags.  Rivers complied.”10  In one of Rivers’ bags, the DEA agent found 
the sum of cash, which was still in a bank envelope.11  Yet, the agent did 
not believe Rivers’ claims about why he had the cash, nor did they believe 
his mother when they called her in Michigan to corroborate the story.12  
The agent said they thought the money was involved in drug activity, 
despite the fact that the agent found no guns, drugs, or other material in 
Rivers’s belongings that indicated that he was involved in drug trading.13  
Ultimately, the agent did not arrest him or charge him with a crime, “but 
the DEA agent took his cash anyway—every last cent.”14 
Matt Lee of Clare, Michigan, was pulled over in 2011 on Interstate 80 
in Humboldt County, Nevada.15  Lee was traveling from his parents’ home 
in Nevada to California, where he was had been promised work.16  He was 
                                                          
 6.  Id.  Clarke was charged for conduct unrelated to the cash he was carrying or any drug charges.  
Id.  Clarke was charged with resisting arrest and assaulting an officer for allegedly “yelling” and 
“struggling” with officers during the incident.  Id.  The charges were subsequently dropped, although 
law enforcement kept the cash.  Id. 
 7.  Joline Gutierrez Krueger, DEA to Traveler: Thanks, I’ll Take that Cash, ALBUQUERQUE J. 
(May 6, 2015, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/580107/dea-agents-seize-16000-from-
aspiring-music-video-producer.html. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Christopher Ingraham, How the DEA took a Young Man’s Life Savings Without Ever 
Charging Him With a Crime, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (May 11, 2015) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/11/how-the-dea-took-a-young-mans-life-
savings-without-ever-charging-him-of-a-crime/?utm_term=.2c10c9b34f0d. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., They Fought the Law. Who Won?, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won. 
 16.  Id. 
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carrying $2,500 in cash, loaned from his father.17  When Lee was pulled 
over by a Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy, the deputy 
asked whether Lee was carrying any currency and summoned a K-9 
officer.  Dove told Lee . . . to get out of the car and stand at the edge of 
the desert, while a dog sniffed for drugs.  The deputy told Lee that he 
didn’t believe his story that he was moving to California, because he was 
carrying so little baggage, Lee told The [Washington] Post.  Lee has no 
criminal record.  When a search turned up Lee’s remaining $2,400 in 
cash, Dove and his colleague exchanged high-fives, Lee said.  Dove said 
he was taking the money under state law because he was convinced that 
Lee was involved in a drug run.  Lee was left with only the $151 in his 
pocket.18 
He eventually “hired a Reno attorney to get his money back and Humboldt 
County agreed to return it.  But the attorney took about half as his fee and 
costs, $1,269.44, leaving Lee with only $1,130.56.”19 
Unfortunately, cases like these are not rare.  Under a legal process 
known as civil asset forfeiture, state and federal laws allow law 
enforcement officials and the government to seize assets from individuals 
who are not charged with a crime if the property is suspected of being 
involved in criminal activity.20  This is true even if the owner of the 
property is not charged with the underlying crime.21  Indeed, in 2014, The 
Washington Post analyzed 400 cases in seventeen states that were 
examples of civil forfeiture during traffic stops.22  Police stopped motorists 
under the pretext of a minor traffic infraction, analyzed the intentions of 
motorists by assessing nervousness, and requested permission to search 
the vehicle without a warrant.23  In most cases, officers did not even make 
an arrest.24 
However, that same study found that between September 11, 2001 and 
September 2014, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) equitable sharing 
program, which allows local law enforcement to share in the proceeds of 
                                                          
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012) (federal general civil forfeiture statute); 21 U.S.C. § 881 
(2012) (federal drug trafficking civil forfeiture statute). 
 21.  See, e.g., United States v. 3120 Banneker Drive, 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1988) 
(stating that “property is subject to civil forfeiture even if its owner is acquitted of—or never called to 
defend against—criminal charges”). 
 22.  O’Harrow Jr. et al., They Fought the Law, supra note 15. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
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property seized through civil forfeiture,25 “was responsible for nearly 
62,000 seizures of cash without warrants or criminal indictments filed 
against the owners.  Of the $2.5 billion forfeited as a result, state and local 
agencies received $1.7 billion and federal agencies received $800 
million.”26 
These numbers are only likely to grow in the coming years.  Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions has expressed support for the practice, calling it 
“appropriate” as a tool for law enforcement,27 and “one of law 
enforcement’s most effective tools to reduce crime.”28  The Attorney 
General recently issued an order29 authorizing forfeiture “whenever the 
conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of federal law.”30 
This order is sweeping in its scope.  Civil asset forfeiture is available 
to the federal government for the proceeds of more than 200 state and 
federal crimes31 under the broad authority of 18 U.S.C. § 981, which 
provides for forfeiture in cases of money laundering, counterfeiting, 
embezzlement, motor vehicle offenses, terrorism, and many other 
crimes.32  These 200 crimes are either enumerated in the text or 
incorporated by reference from the federal money laundering statutes.33  
Many other state and federal statutes also authorize civil forfeiture, 
                                                          
 25.  See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying text discussing the DOJ’s equitable sharing 
program; see also U.S. DEP’T JUST., Equitable Sharing Program, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
mlars/equitable-sharing-program (last updated Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Equitable Sharing 
Program]. 
 26.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 29 (footnote omitted) (citing O’Harrow Jr. et al., supra 
note 15). 
   27.  U.S. DEP’T JUST., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the National District 
Attorneys Association (July 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-
sessions-delivers-remarks-national-district-attorneys-association. 
   28.  OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., Order No. 3946-2017, FEDERAL FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY SEIZED 
BY STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (July 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
file/982611/download.  
   29.  Id. 
   30.  Id.  This supersedes several orders limiting the practice of civil asset forfeiture under 
previous attorney generals.  U.S. DEP’T JUST., POLICY DIRECTIVE 17-1, POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ORDER ON FEDERAL ADOPTION AND FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY SEIZED BY 
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENICES (2017), https://www.justice.gov/file/982616/ 
download.  
 31.  Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ BULL. Nov. 2007, at 59, 62, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/ 
2007/12/21/usab5506.pdf. 
 32.  18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2012). 
 33.  Id. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1961(1) (2012).  One exception is for currency reporting offenses that 
violate Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 of the United States Code—for which civil and criminal 
forfeiture is authorized under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (2012).  See STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET 
FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 27-2, at 961 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter CASSELLA, ASSET 
FORFEITURE LAW IN THE U.S.]. 
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including, importantly, 21 U.S.C. § 881, which specifically authorizes 
forfeiture for drug trafficking.34 
In addition, asset forfeiture is available for almost any type of property 
that may be involved in criminal activity, including real property, 
automobiles, firearms, and, of course, cash.35  This Article focuses on a 
particularly difficult type of dispute to resolve, as in the examples above, 
of civil forfeiture of cash assets.  This type of dispute can arise fairly 
frequently in the world of civil forfeiture disputes, sometimes due to 
seizures based on federal structuring law,36 under which the government 
can seize assets that it suspects are being deposited in bank accounts 
strategically to avoid reporting requirements.37  Cash forfeiture can arise 
in other cases as well, as illustrated above with traffic stops leading to 
forfeiture of cash assets suspected, legitimately or not, of being involved 
in narcotics investigations.38 
As this Article will show, civil forfeiture disputes regarding cash are 
some of the most difficult to resolve due to the psychological and 
structural nature of these disputes.  However, as these disputes arise fairly 
frequently, tools are needed for judges and the judicial system as a whole 
to resolve them.  While legislative action could help resolve these disputes 
by changing the legal framework within which they occur, until that time, 
judges are tasked with resolving civil forfeiture actions.  By focusing on 
the nature of these disputes, and analyzing the judicial role in encouraging 
settlement, this Article proceeds in four parts. 
Part II of this Article describes the issue of civil forfeiture, and the 
legal mechanisms that allow the government to seize control of assets 
without a criminal conviction.  It also describes the legal mechanisms that 
individuals who have had their assets seized can use to try to recover these 
assets, and shows how these recoveries are treated as civil, rather than 
criminal, matters that proceed against the property itself rather than the 
individual. 
Part III discusses the nature of these civil forfeiture disputes from a 
dispute resolution perspective and explores why these suits are unlikely to 
settle despite being civil matters.  In particular, this Part describes the 
barriers to resolution that these conflicts have to overcome, including both 
structural barriers as well as psychological barriers that impact both the 
government and the defendants. 
                                                          
 34.  21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). 
 35.  18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)–(G). 
 36.  See Timothy J. Ford, Note, Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 455, 456 (2015). 
 37.  31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012). 
 38.  See O’Harrow Jr. et al., They Fought the Law, supra note 15. 
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Part IV looks to modern trends in judging to see how judges can and 
should respond to conflicts such as civil forfeiture that are unlikely to settle 
on their own.  The managerial style of judging is now ascendant both in 
the civil and criminal contexts.  Under the managerial style of judging, the 
management of cases is more important than any particular trial, and 
judges attempt to involve themselves in cases in order to promote 
settlement.  Under this conception of the judicial role, judges can take an 
active role in encouraging settlement of civil forfeiture disputes. 
Part V uses the lens of dispute resolution to guide judges using this 
managerial role to help settle civil forfeiture disputes.  It encourages 
judges to analyze the structure of these disputes to better understand how 
to manage these cases appropriately.  This Part suggests that judges can 
encourage settlement by changing the parties’ alternatives, changing the 
bargaining zone, and removing the zero sum nature of the disputes through 
procedural mechanisms. 
The Article then ends with a brief conclusion that suggests areas for 
further improvement of these disputes. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING CIVIL FORFEITURE DISPUTES 
Civil forfeiture actions have a long legal history in the United States, 
although their use has increased significantly given two somewhat recent 
reforms.  This Part lays out the legal basis for civil forfeiture actions as 
well as discusses the justifications and, importantly, the criticisms of the 
procedure. 
A.  The Legal Basis for Civil Asset Forfeiture 
The origins of forfeiture laws in the United States can be traced back 
to seventeenth century English maritime law, which allowed violations to 
be punished by seizure and forfeiture of ships and cargo.39  Borrowing 
from these laws, the first Congress created the initial federal forfeiture 
statutes in 1789 to authorize the forfeiture of ships and cargo involved in 
customs violations.40  Eventually these statutes were expanded to cover 
vessels involved in piracy and the slave trade.41  In the nineteenth century, 
                                                          
 39.  Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from 
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 93–96 (1996). 
 40.  CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE U.S., supra note 33, § 2-2 at 29 (citing Austin v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611–14 (1993)). 
 41.  Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 340–41(1998)). 
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Congress expanded the forfeiture power during the Civil War42 and, in the 
twentieth century, expanded the power during prohibition to reach 
property involved with crimes involving taxes on alcohol and distilled 
spirits, counterfeiting, gambling, drug trafficking, and smuggling.43 
The government’s forfeiture authority, and the number of civil 
forfeiture cases brought, increased dramatically due to two more recent 
law changes.  In 1978 Congress rewrote federal drug forfeiture laws to 
authorize the government to forfeit proceeds of drug crimes.44  Then again 
in 1984, civil forfeiture law changed significantly when Congress gave the 
government the ability to forfeit property used to facilitate drug crimes 
(rather than just the proceeds) as part of amendments to the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.45  Instead of 
forfeiting only property used to commit violations, the government now 
had the ability to take “any property that made the crime easier to commit 
or harder to detect.”46  In addition, these amendments created the DOJ’s 
Assets Forfeiture Fund for depositing forfeiture proceeds for federal 
agency use.47  Lawmakers in several states have followed the federal 
model and amended their states’ civil forfeiture laws to fund local and state 
agencies with seized forfeiture assets.48 
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) somewhat 
curtailed the power of these amended federal civil forfeiture laws.49  The 
CAFRA reforms added increased protections for property owners, 
including time limits for the government to provide notice and file 
forfeiture actions, a defense for innocent owners, and hardship 
exemptions.50  CAFRA also “required the government, not the claimant, 
to prove the property is connected to a crime, eliminated the requirement 
that claimants post a bond before being able to contest a civil forfeiture in 
court, and provided representation for indigent claimants under limited 
                                                          
 42.  Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 39, at 98–99. 
 43.  CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE U.S., supra note 33, § 2-4 at 33. 
 44.  Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2012). 
 45.  CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE U.S., supra note 33, § 2-4 at 33; 21 U.S.C. § 
881(a)(7); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984). 
 46.  Stefan D. Cassella, An Overview of Asset Forfeiture in the United States, in CIVIL 
FORFEITURE OF CRIMINAL PROPERTY: LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 
23, 27–28 (Simon N.M. Young ed., 2009) [hereinafter Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture] (citing 
United States v. Shifferli, 895 F. 2d. 987, 990 (4th
 
Cir. 1990)). 
 47.  Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1976, 2052 
(1984) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. 524(c)). 
 48.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 10. 
 49.  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 983, 985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2465–67). 
 50.  Ford, supra note 36, at 461. 
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circumstances.”51  Despite these reforms, critics of civil forfeiture claim 
that still not enough is done to protect property owners.52 
While there is “no single all-encompassing federal forfeiture 
statute[,]”53 there are a number of statutes that authorize civil forfeiture for 
a broad range of property involved in a broad range of criminal activity.54  
The federal civil drug forfeiture statute authorizes forfeiture of 
[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value 
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a 
controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of [Subchapter I of 
Chapter 13 of Title 21], all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and 
all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities, used or intended to 
be used to facilitate any [such] violation[,]55 
along with ten other classes of property.56  This gives broad civil forfeiture 
authority for proceeds of all Title 21 crimes and felony violations thereof.57 
The other commonly used civil forfeiture statute is 18 U.S.C. § 981, 
which also provides a broad swath of forfeiture authority.58  Pursuant to 
§ 981(a), there are over 200 state and federal crimes59 that subject property 
involved to civil forfeiture, including providing for forfeiture in cases of 
money laundering, counterfeiting, embezzlement, motor vehicle offenses, 
terrorism, and many other crimes.60  These 200 crimes are either 
enumerated in the text of § 981(a), or incorporated by reference from the 
federal money laundering statutes.61  Many federal statutes also authorize 
civil forfeiture, and many other state statutes do as well.62 
                                                          
 51.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 168 n.11. 
 52.  See David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 
13 NEV. L.J. 1, 23–32 (2012) (surveying criticisms of CAFRA). 
 53.  Gaumer, supra note 31, at 60.  
 54.  Id. 
 55.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2012). 
 56.  See id. § 881(a); see also Gaumer, supra note 31, at 60–61. 
 57.  This covers violations of Subchapter I of Chapter 13, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904, and violations 
of Subchapter II of Chapter 13, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951–971. 
 58.  Graumer, supra note 31, at 61. 
 59.  Id. at 62. 
 60.  18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2012). 
 61.  Id. § 1956(c)(7) (2012); see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO), 
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968).  
One exception is for currency reporting offenses that violate Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 
of the United States Code—for which civil and criminal forfeiture is authorized under 31 U.S.C. § 
5317(c) (2012).  CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE U.S., supra note 33, § 27-2 at 961. 
 62.  Gaumer, supra note 31, at 62. 
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B.  The Nature of Civil Forfeiture Actions 
In a civil forfeiture case, the government files a civil action in rem 
against the property itself and must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the property was derived from or was used to commit a 
crime.  Because a civil forfeiture does not depend on a criminal conviction 
and is an in rem action against the property itself, the forfeiture action may 
be filed without a criminal indictment.63 
One amusing result of the fact that the proceedings are in rem—i.e. 
against the property itself—is the rise of peculiar case names,64 such as 
United States v. Ninety-Three (93) Firearms,65 United States v. One 1992 
Ford Mustang GT,66 United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. 
Funds,67 and United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark 
Fins.68  However, while this may seem to imply that the property itself is 
guilty of a crime,69 courts justified this legal fiction as a procedural 
convenience to give anyone with an interest in the property to come 
forward at once rather than having “a separate civil action against every 
person or entity with a potential legal interest in the property.”70 
Because civil forfeiture proceeds against the property in rem, there is 
no need for a criminal conviction to accompany the civil proceedings.  
Therefore, many of the usual criminal law protections do not apply.  For 
example, pursuing both a civil and criminal forfeiture based on the same 
                                                          
 63.  See Jeffrey Simser, Perspectives on Civil Forfeiture, in CIVIL FORFEITURE OF CRIMINAL 
PROPERTY: LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 13, 15 (Simon N.M. Young 
ed., 2009).  See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 668 n.16 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The most notable 
distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture proceedings are brought against 
property, not against the property owner; the owner’s culpability is irrelevant in deciding whether 
property should be forfeited.”); United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present and 
Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(“Because civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the property subject to forfeiture is the defendant.  
Thus, defenses against the forfeiture can be brought only by third parties, who must intervene.”); 
United States v. $734,578.82 in U.S. Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[Civil] forfeiture 
is not conditioned upon the culpability of the owner of the defendant property.”). 
 64.  Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
BULL. Nov. 2007, at 15 [hereinafter Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN], https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2007/12/21/usab5506.pdf. 
 65.  330 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 66.  73 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 67.  287 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 68.  520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 69.  See LastWeekTonight, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO): Civil Forfeiture, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2014), https://youtu.be/3kEpZWGgJks (including a skit in which a house is put 
under arrest).  
 70.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16 (citing United States v. Ursery, 
518 U.S. 267, 297 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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underlying offense is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment Double 
Jeopardy Clause.71  Even an acquittal on the criminal claim does not bar a 
civil forfeiture action by the government.72  Similarly, an overturned 
criminal conviction has no effect on the civil forfeiture action.73 
Procedurally, civil forfeiture actions are similar to other civil cases.74  
18 U.S.C. § 983 and Supplemental Rule G of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure govern civil forfeiture procedure.75 
First, the government plaintiff files a verified forfeiture complaint 
alleging that, pursuant to one of the many forfeiture statutes, the relevant 
property is subject to civil forfeiture.76  Claimants to the property must 
then answer the complaint and file their property claims within the period 
prescribed by statute.77 
The case moves through the regular process of civil discovery, motion 
practice, and trial.78  Claimants may request a jury trial to establish they 
were the innocent owner, as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.79  
The government must establish by a preponderance of evidence that the 
property is subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.80 
If the government establishes a connection between the property and 
a criminal offense, a person can still contest the forfeiture by proving the 
elements of the innocent owner defense.81  To protect the interests of those 
                                                          
 71.  Ursery, 518 U.S. at 270–71. 
 72.  United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (holding that an 
acquittal of a firearms violation under 18 U.S.C. § 922 does not bar civil forfeiture under § 982(d)); 
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam) 
(holding that acquittal on a smuggling charge does not bar a later civil forfeiture action); United States 
v. 1988 Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme 2 Door, 983 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that acquittal 
of a claimant does not create material issue of fact as to avoid summary judgment in civil forfeiture 
case).  
 73.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16 (citing United States v. One 
“Piper” Aztec “f” De Luxe Model 250 Pa 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27–7654057, 321 F.3d 355, 
360–61 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 74.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16. 
 75.   Id.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id.  If no one responds to the initial notice of forfeiture, “the agency concludes the matter by 
entering a declaration of forfeiture that has the same force and effect as a judicial order.”  Cassella, 
Overview of Asset Forfeiture, supra note 46, at 38; see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 78.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16. 
 79.  Id.; see United States v. Bearden, 328 F.3d 1011, 1014 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
claimant has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on her innocent owner defense). 
 80.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16; see One “Piper” Aztec, 321 
F.3d at 357. 
 81.  CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE IN THE U.S., supra note 33, § 1-4, at 16; Stefan D. Cassella, 
The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil Asset Forfeiture: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
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innocent property owners either unaware that their property was being 
used for illegal purposes, or those owners who took reasonable steps to 
stop the use, Congress enacted a “uniform innocent owner defense.”82  
Under the statute, a person contesting forfeiture must establish both 
ownership interests and innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.83  
This statute has been criticized as removing the presumption of innocence 
and shifting the burden of proving a negative onto the innocent owner.84 
C.  Justifications for Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Justifications for civil asset forfeiture are fourfold.85  First, law 
enforcement justifies civil forfeiture as a means to both punish wrongdoers 
and prevent the tools of the crime from being used again by removing them 
from circulation.86  This is particularly true of the instrumentalities of 
crime, such as guns or cars with compartments used to conceal drugs, but 
can also be justified to remove property where drugs are sold (i.e. a “crack 
house”) or businesses used to commit criminal activity, such as insurance 
fraud.87 
Asset forfeiture is also justified as an effective way to recover property 
that may be used to compensate innocent victims, such as in cases 
involving property offenses and fraud.88  Forfeiture accomplishes this goal 
by preserving this property pending trial, so that the property is available 
after the case has settled.89 
Forfeiture of assets is also a way to reduce incentives for crime by 
reducing the profit motive.90  Asset forfeiture reduces the incentive of an 
individual criminal from engaging in economic crime, while also avoiding 
the impression that criminal enterprise is worth the risk, especially 
                                                          
of 2000 Creates a Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Most Civil Forfeiture Cases Filed by the 
Federal Government, 89 KY. L.J. 653, 654–55 (2001) [hereinafter Cassella, Uniform Innoncent Owner 
Defense]. 
 82.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 16 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) 
(2012)). 
 83.  Cassella, Uniform Innoncent Owner Defense, supra note 80, at 671–72. 
 84.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
 85.  See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) (noting that forfeitures help “punish 
wrongdoing, deter future illegality, and ‘lessen the economic power’ of criminal enterprises” and are 
also used to “recompense victims of crime”). 
 86.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 8. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2012) (authorizing the government to use property forfeited in 
civil forfeiture cases to pay restitution to victims of underlying crimes); 21 U.S.C. § 853(i) (2012) 
(treating criminal forfeiture in the same fashion). 
 89.  Cassella, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN, supra note 64, at 8. 
 90.  Id. 
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compared to a regime where criminals would be allowed to keep the 
profits of their criminal enterprise.91  The message is also sent to “law-
abiding citizens” that crime does not pay, by stripping the criminal of the 
“trappings” of an expensive and often “enviable lifestyle.”92  Seeing the 
loss of expensive goods and property enjoyed by the criminal sends a 
signal that the benefits of a criminal enterprise are “illusory” or 
“temporary.”93  Finally, asset forfeiture also functions as a method of  
punishment.94  Giving a criminal his “just [deserts]” is an important 
punishment motive for asset forfeiture.95 
D.  Criticisms of Civil Forfeiture 
As a result of increased media scrutiny from the likes of The New 
Yorker,96 The Washington Post,97 and even comedian John Oliver,98 
several executive branch agencies have changed their policies regarding 
civil forfeiture.  However, several criticisms remain. 
1.  Profit Incentives for Law Enforcement Officers 
One of the major criticisms of the current civil asset forfeiture laws in 
the United States is the incentives that are created for law enforcement to 
pursue civil forfeiture.99  Funds and property seized through civil asset 
forfeiture are deposited in the DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund.100  In 1986, 
the year after the fund was established, it took in $93.7 million in deposits, 
                                                          
 91.  Id;  see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 343–44 (1998) (civil forfeiture 
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Dollars from Motorists not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-
seize/?utm_term=.66a8aade0e23.  
 98.  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 69. 
 99.  See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 43. 
 100.  Id. at 10. 
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but in 2014 that number had increased to $4.5 billion.101  Net assets, the 
amount retained in the fund, topped $1 billion in 2007 and increased to 
$4.5 billion in 2014.102  State data is more difficult to come by because of 
the lack of reporting requirements, but for states where data is available, 
there is a similar rate of growth, with Texas seizing $46 million in 2012, 
followed by Arizona at $43 million.103  Money seized through forfeiture is 
a large source of revenue for these federal and state agencies, and critics 
argue this gives these agencies a large incentive to “police for profit.”104 
In addition, local law enforcement agencies that coordinate 
enforcement operations with the federal government, such as in narcotics 
investigations, can share in the funds seized through what is known as the 
“Equitable Sharing Program.”105  Through this program, federally 
forfeited property can be shared with participating state and local law 
enforcement agencies.106  The state and local agencies can participate in 
joint investigations with federal agencies, either through participation in 
federal task forces, joint task forces, or local investigations that develop in 
to federal cases.107  Alternatively, state and local agencies can share in 
federal sharing even after the funds are seized, through what is known as 
“adoption.”108  A federal agency can choose to “adopt” property turned 
over to it “where the conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of 
federal law and where federal law provides for forfeiture.”109 
The incentives for law enforcement to participate in equitable sharing 
are significant.  Under the Equitable Sharing Program, up to 80% of seized 
assets can be returned to law enforcement to pay for law enforcement 
budgetary activities.110  While the Justice Department has recently 
reformed the recommendations for what can be paid for with seized assets, 
the list is still very broad and exceptions remain.111  In the past, seized 
                                                          
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 11. 
 104.  Id. at 2;  see also BART J. WILSON & MICHAEL PRECIADO, INST. FOR JUST., BAD APPLES OR 
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 105.  See Equitable Sharing Program, supra note 25; CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 25. 
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 107.  Id. at 6. 
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 109.  Id. 
 110.  Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-
spending/. 
 111.  See U.S. DEP’T JUST., POLICY DIRECTIVE 17-1, supra note 30; see also Rebecca R. Ruiz, 
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assets have been used to pay for a wide variety of legitimate and not so 
legitimate expenses.  One of The Washington Post’s investigations found 
that seized funds were used not only to pay for guns, armored cars, and 
electronic surveillance, but also luxury vehicles, travel, and a clown named 
Sparkles.112  There is virtually no check on what seized funds can be spent 
on, and thus, in addition to funding for the district attorney general, 
equipment, training and salaries for personnel, funds have been used for 
popcorn machines, catering, baseball leagues, and directly to law 
enforcement officers themselves.113  Equitable sharing is used as a routine 
source of funding at every level114 and has been extremely profitable for 
law enforcement agencies. 
This “policing for profit” motive, critics suggest, impacts the way that 
policing is done.115  As part of a multi-year investigation, a television news 
team in Tennessee found that more than ten times as many stops were 
made on the side of the highway coming back from the East Coast, 
presumably after drug sales were made, than on the side headed to the East 
Coast, which may also contain drugs.116 
2.  Difficulties in Challenging Civil Forfeiture 
Another criticism leveled against the civil forfeiture process is the 
difficulty that claimants face in challenging civil forfeiture actions.  Critics 
point out that civil forfeiture proceedings can take a year or more to 
resolve117 and require the assistance of counsel.118  Because the action is a 
civil proceeding rather than a criminal one, property claimants have no 
right to counsel, and so must acquire counsel at their own cost.119  Without 
an attorney, claimants face a severe disadvantage, as deadlines for claims 
                                                          
Justice Dept. Revives Criticized Policy Allowing Assets to Be Seized, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), 
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 113.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 16. 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  See id. at 2–3. 
 116.  Id. at 16. 
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opposing civil forfeiture proceedings can be harsh,120 and trials can be 
potentially long and complicated.121  Filing a civil forfeiture action comes 
with additional risks, including increased attention from law enforcement 
leading to a criminal prosecution and exposure to civil discovery, 
including depositions.122  Indeed, several potential claimants who have had 
their property seized were threatened with criminal prosecution if they 
chose to object to the forfeiture.123 
In addition, several states make it even more difficult to challenge civil 
forfeiture in court.  In Illinois, for example, property owners must first pay 
a bond of $100 or ten percent of the property’s value, whichever is 
greater.124  If the owners challenge and lose, they must pay the full cost of 
the forfeiture proceedings, including the government legal costs, and give 
up the full value of the bond in addition to the property seized.125  Even if 
the claimants win, they lose ten percent of the value of the bond in addition 
to attorney costs.126 
Overcoming these hurdles is frequently difficult for claimants, 
especially because the amount seized is often small enough that it may not 
be worth pursuing a claim.  Data compiled by the libertarian-leaning 
Institute for Justice found that in ten states, the median property value 
forfeited ranged from $451 in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah.127  Similarly, 
the more liberal American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania found 
that between 2011 and 2013, half of all cash only forfeiture cases in 
Philadelphia involved less than $192.128  It is unsurprising, then, that 
forfeitures often go unchallenged by property owners.129 
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(2015), https://www.aclupa.org/files/3214/3326/0426/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf.  
 129.  CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 3, at 12. 
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3.  Low Standards of Proof 
Another concern of critics of civil forfeiture is the low standard of 
proof that is needed to seize assets.130  For most federal and state laws 
regarding most types of property, all law enforcement officers need to 
seize property is “probable cause” that the assets are connected to a crime 
that allows civil forfeiture, such as narcotics sales or money laundering.131  
The low burden of proof extends to the civil forfeiture action itself, in 
which prosecutors must only meet the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is 
required in criminal cases.132  Importantly, this applies both to the proof 
that the crime was committed and to the proof that the property was 
derived from or was used to commit the crime.133 
III.  BARRIERS TO SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL FORFEITURE DISPUTES 
A.  Alternatives to Settlement 
One major barrier to the settlement of any dispute is the existence of 
a positive incentive for one or more of the participants to not settle the 
dispute.  Negotiators on both sides of a dispute should regularly evaluate 
the “bargaining chips” that are derived from “the outcome that the law will 
impose if no agreement is reached.”134  This outcome that can be achieved 
away from the negotiating table is frequently referred to in the negotiation 
literature as the negotiator’s “best alternative to negotiated agreement” or 
BATNA for short.135  The BATNA determines the range of possible 
bargaining outcomes, as negotiators should measure whatever offer is on 
the table relative to whatever their BATNA.136  Presumably, if the offer 
“at the table” is worse than the alternatives “away from the table,” this is 
an offer that should not be agreed to by the party contemplating it.137  
Effectively, the parties’ respective BATNAs set both the ceiling and floor 
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for the negotiation, and the range of possible outcomes between them 
becomes what is known as the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).138 
Parties will measure the difference between the offer and the BATNA 
in terms of their own interests, which are the underlying reasons that 
motivate the parties to come to an agreement, whether those be financial, 
emotional, or reputational.  The total amount that all sides perceive the 
deal they arrive at to be better than their BATNA is the amount of the 
“value creation” in the negotiation.139 
“What stands out to me is the nature of how pervasive and dependent 
police really are on civil-asset forfeiture—it’s their bread and butter—and, 
therefore, how difficult it is to engage in systemic reform,” Vanita Gupta, 
of the American Civil Liberties Union, said to The New Yorker.140  This 
quote suggests one of the reasons that in the case of civil forfeiture, the 
government would be unlikely to settle this dispute.  As noted above, the 
government, and in particular law enforcement, has financial incentives to 
keep as much of the money as possible.  Because civil forfeiture money 
makes up a large part of both certain prosecutor’s offices’ budgets, as well 
as the budgets of law enforcement agencies, the chance of keeping the 
money through legal challenge, even at the risk of losing some of the cases, 
seems like a strong BATNA for the government.  It is interesting to 
consider the relatively weak BATNA of the claimant as well, who has 
incentives to “settle” the case, but by walking away, as many do.  
However, there may be other incentives keeping them from settling, such 
as equity and justice seeking. 
B.  Equity and Justice Seeking 
In cases of civil forfeiture, settlement may be more difficult to come 
by than in a regular civil case due to the equity and justice seeking 
behavior, particularly of the owners of the property being seized.  Many 
of these owners feel aggrieved because they perceive their treatment as 
unfair, and will refuse to settle cases in order to get back all they believe 
they are owed.  For example, Mandrel Stuart had $17,550 taken from him 
during a traffic stop for a minor infraction in 2012.141  The thirty-
five-year-old African American owner of a small barbecue restaurant in 
Staunton, Virginia rejected a settlement offer for half of the money and 
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demanded a jury trial instead.142  As he stated, “I paid taxes on that money. 
I worked for that money, . . . Why should I give them my money?”143  This 
attitude, while understandable given the situation, certainly does not 
promote settlement.  In these cases, the sense of equity and justice seeking 
may be so strong that the owner of the property will go to trial and risk 
losing all of their cash rather than settle for a portion of it. 
Another motivation for the owners of seized cash may be to shine a 
light on the perceived misdeeds of the government representatives in this 
case.  This was certainly the motivation of James Morrow, an African 
American worker at a Tyson plant in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, who was pulled 
over in August 2007 in Tenaha, Texas.144  Police pulled Morrow over for 
“driving too close to the white line” and took $3,900 from him, which he 
had recently withdrawn to pay for dental work.145  Morrow had his car 
impounded and was taken to jail where he pleaded with authorities to call 
his bank to see proof of his recent cash withdrawal, but they declined.146  
While Morrow was encouraged by authorities to avoid getting a lawyer, 
he did so anyway, with the motivation, as he told The New Yorker, “‘to 
shine a big ol’ light on them.’”147 
Morrow was in fact so motivated he took time off work to come to 
Nagadoches, Texas from his home in Arkansas to meet with a lawyer and 
eventually become the lead plaintiff in a class action against law 
enforcement in Tenaha.148  He would eventually take off of work again for 
the trial, as would many of the other plaintiffs from around the country 
who were impacted by highway interdiction in Tenaha.149  This personal 
interest in the case by the plaintiffs, when they were not there to testify but 
rather only to attend depositions,150 suggests that their interests in the case 
are clearly beyond the financial, as it costs time away from work and extra 
money to attend such an event.  Clearly, a financial settlement for these 
individuals would not fully meet their interests. 
This motivation to expose misdeeds was also motivating Matt Lee, 
mentioned in Part I, who, even after settling his case, remained unsatisfied 
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with the resolution.151  After the case, in February of 2014, “Lee wrote an 
angry opinion piece about his experiences for the Silver Pinyon Journal, 
an online news service in Humboldt County.”152  The opinion piece stated: 
‘I intend to throw a spotlight on this little operation they’ve got going on 
in Humboldt County, Nevada,’ he wrote.  ‘I intend to make it as difficult 
as possible for them to continue with their modus operandi.  If they are 
going to violate civil rights, I’m going to make sure people hear about 
it.’153 
These interests in making people pay or to expose their rough 
treatment make a standard settlement of a civil dispute, i.e. monetary 
compensation, unlikely.  Because the primary interests here are more 
closely tied to respect and voice in the process, a settlement that gives the 
claimant some or all of their money is unlikely to satisfy them entirely. 
C.  The Zero-Sum Nature of the Dispute 
One particular issue with cash forfeiture is the zero-sum nature of the 
dispute.  Zero-sum disputes are ones in which there are no tradeoffs among 
multiple issues, as the parties are disputing over a single asset.154  In the 
case of cash forfeiture, the parties are negotiating over a single asset—i.e. 
the amount of cash—where it is true that a dollar in the government’s 
pocket is a dollar that is not in the original owner’s pocket and vice versa.  
It is not possible to share currency or divide ownership in some other way, 
as may be possible with, say, real property, in which ownership can be 
divided over time or rental value can be split among many people.  The 
indivisible nature of the forfeited cash in dispute can lead to a “zero-sum 
mindset” or “fixed pie” thinking, which creates a serious stumbling block 
in negotiation.155  This view of the dispute can hamper negotiations or 
cause them to break down entirely because the mindset that a gain for the 
other party is seen as a loss for me makes any mutually beneficial trades a 
psychological impossibility.156 
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D.  Lack of Pre-Trial Resolution Procedures 
The particular laws around cash forfeiture exacerbate the zero-sum 
nature of civil cash forfeiture disputes.  These lack of pre-trial resolution 
procedures both discourage early settlement of cases and puts the 
imperative on judges to resolve these disputes.157 
1.  Lack of Hardship Release as a Form of Pre-Trial Resolution 
For most types of civil asset forfeiture, the property owner may seek 
what is known as “hardship release” to secure pretrial return of seized 
property.158  In order to reduce the burden of civil forfeiture, CAFRA 
“entitles claimants to ‘immediate release of seized property’ pending the 
outcome of trial[,]” as long as the claimant meets five criteria that balance 
the risk of destruction of the property with the hardship to the claimant.159  
It would seem that hardship release might give judges a way to resolve a 
dispute before trial by creating a mechanism for at least releasing some or 
all of the seized assets.  However, paragraph (8) in the same section as 
hardship release specifically exempts currency from hardship release, 
unless those cash assets are the entire assets of a legitimate business.160  
Hardship release, which would seem to be a pre-trial resolution 
mechanism, is unavailable to judges in this instance.161 
2.  Lack of Other Forms of Pre-Trial Resolution 
Other forms of pre-trial resolution are also unavailable for cash civil 
forfeiture disputes.  Another strategy for pre-trial release of property is 
through the claimant submitting a petition for remission or mitigation.162  
“Remission refers to the complete release of the seized property, [whereas] 
mitigation refers to . . . returning some, but not all, of the property.”163  
While seizing agencies each have regulations to govern civil forfeiture 
                                                          
 157.  See infra Part IV. 
 157.  Ford, supra note 36, at 465–66.  
 159.  Id. at 465; 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(1)(A)–(E) (2012). 
 160.  18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(8)(A).  Ford, supra note 36, at 465–66, n.89 (citing Kaloti Wholesale, 
Inc. v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 2007)). 
 161.  See Christopher Ingraham, Since 2007, the DEA has Taken $3.2 Billion in Cash from People 
not Charged with a Crime, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/29/since-2007-the-dea-has-taken-3-2-
billion-in-cash-from-people-not-charged-with-a-crime/. 
 162.  Ford, supra note 36, at 463. 
 163.  Id. (citing DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS 72 (3rd ed. 2014)).  
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proceedings,164 and these mechanisms are “intended to alleviate some of 
the harshness of seizure and forfeiture[,]165 both options fail to” provide 
an adequate pre-trial resolution to a civil forfeiture cash dispute.  As others 
have noted, the remission and mitigation process is subject to the almost 
complete discretion of the seizing agency (including the discretion to deny 
all relief), the seizing agency is not required to provide a hearing, and 
judicial review of these administrative proceedings are extremely 
limited.166  Similarly, motions to challenge unlawful seizures under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g)167 are extremely time limited 
and are only granted before the forfeiture action by the government 
commences,168 making it unavailable as a pre-trial resolution mechanism. 
This lack of pre-trial dispute resolution mechanisms limits the ability of 
judges to resolve disputes and limit the parties’ opportunity for 
interactions leading to settlement. 
E.  Endowment Effects and Other Psychological Phenomena 
A number of psychological barriers to settlement exist in the civil cash 
forfeiture context that also makes settlement of these cases unlikely.  
While barriers to settlement exist in all civil disputes,169 a few seem 
particularly salient in this context. 
First is the role of endowment effects.170  The endowment effect, at its 
core, is that “[a] thing possessed becomes more valuable to the holder than 
to the market.”171  In general, disputants are less sensitive to their current 
entitlements and more sensitive to their change relative entitlements.172  In 
the case of civil forfeiture, it is difficult to achieve settlement if one or the 
other disputant is in the grip of this particular effect.  In particular, it is 
likely that once the government has seized the property, they are likely to 
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overvalue it because it is in their possession, and are less likely to settle 
the dispute because of their feeling of relative entitlement to the proceeds. 
Closely related to this is the concept of loss aversion,173 meaning 
“[p]eople are risk seeking in the face of losses.”174  If a scenario is framed 
as a potential loss, people are more likely to spend extra time and energy 
in avoiding this loss than they would in the case of a similar gain.175  In 
the case of civil forfeiture, if lawyers for the government perceive any 
settlement as a “loss” that they are incurring, relative to the entitlement 
they feel to the cash already seized, they will be more “risk seeking” in 
taking a chance at a civil forfeiture judgment against them (or an innocent 
owner defense succeeding) than being inclined to settle the dispute.  The 
nature of civil forfeiture disputes, in which the laws are structured such 
that any unopposed claim by the government automatically is forfeited, 
plays in to this entitlement perspective.  Similarly, if claimants to property 
perceive the forfeiture against them as a loss, they too will be more risk 
seeking in trying to regain what they see as their lost property.  They will 
be more likely to take the risk of litigating for a potential win in 
challenging a civil forfeiture action or raising an innocent owner defense, 
where they might ordinarily settle or walk away in the face of another type 
of loss. 
A final psychological phenomenon that plays in to the settlement of 
forfeiture disputes is the concept of fairness as a decision-making 
criterion,176 where people are likely to “reject deals that leave them better 
off than no deal if they perceive that their norms of fairness are being 
violated in accepting the deal.”177  This may be particularly salient for 
defendants in this context, who may be particularly aggrieved at their 
rough treatment at the hands of law enforcement and are willing to reject 
any deal that is offered as a settlement even if is better than no agreement 
and the risk of going to hearing.  As expressed above,178 many potential 
claimants feel aggrieved at the process of civil forfeiture and therefore are 
unlikely to settle, particularly for a mere monetary settlement. 
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IV.  THE ROLE OF THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE IN CIVIL FORFEITURE 
DISPUTES 
Even if it is true, as claimed above, that civil forfeiture cases are 
unlikely to settle due to the structural and psychological barriers affecting 
these types of disputes, it may seem outside the traditional judicial role for 
judges to influence on this state of affairs.  Under the “traditional judicial 
role,” judges are the more passive actors, with the parties and their counsel 
taking the active role in framing disputes, and the judge then using legal 
standards to resolve those disputes.179  Under this conception of judging, 
judges are not meant to influence the settlement or lack thereof of any 
particular case, as this would allow too much control over the process and 
potentially lead to coerced settlements.180 
However, this traditional role conception is increasingly outdated, as 
can be seen by looking at the judicial settlement conference, a now 
common practice in the civil context.  In the judicial settlement 
conference, judges take a “managerial,” rather than passive, role towards 
their docket, and meet with counsel and the parties to settle cases before 
they come to trial.181  Under the managerial conception of judges, the 
management of the case docket and the efficient resolution of cases is 
more important than the trial of any  individual case.182  The managerial 
“judge can have a positive impact on the outcome of a dispute by 
becoming more, rather than less, involved.”183 
While this may be appropriate for the civil context, as noted above, a 
civil forfeiture dispute can be seen as a hybrid between a civil and criminal 
case.  However, the model of the managerial judge has also been adopted 
in the criminal context.184  The plea bargain, traditionally a private 
resolution between the prosecution and defense counsel and their client in 
criminal cases, has seen increased judicial participation become the 
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norm.185  As the judicial role conception for judges in both the civil and 
criminal contexts shifts to a managerial role, judges can also play an 
appropriate role in the in the resolution of civil forfeiture disputes.186 
Given this modern managerial role for judges handling disputes, 
including civil forfeiture disputes, judges operating in the managerial role 
can and indeed should take actions that allow them to manage their docket 
appropriately, and one aspect of this management is, of course, to 
encourage the settlement of cases.  The next Part of this Article discusses 
some actions that a judge, who is looking to help settle civil forfeiture 
cases, can take to overcome the barriers already identified.187 
V.  OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO SETTLEMENT IN CIVIL FORFEITURE 
DISPUTES 
Certainly, one way to make things easier for innocent property owners 
who may be impacted by civil forfeiture is to abolish the practice 
altogether, and certainly, some have called for this exact result.188  
However, it is important to remember that civil forfeiture does have 
several advantages189 and that we are unlikely to see legislative change 
soon.  At the moment, only New Mexico, Nebraska, and the District of 
Columbia have banned the use of civil forfeiture absent a criminal 
conviction.190  Until legislative change is available, judicial settlement can 
encourage resolution of these cases. 
A.  Using Settlement Conferences to Encourage Procedural Justice 
One of the best tools that judges can use in the encouragement of 
settlement in these cases is to embrace the idea of finding procedural, 
rather than distributive, justice in these cases.  While distributive justice 
“focuses on perceptions of and criteria to determine the substantive 
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fairness of . . . outcomes[,]”191 “[p]rocedural justice is concerned with the 
fairness of the procedures or processes that are used to arrive at 
outcomes.”192 
Procedural justice is evaluated by disputants focusing on four 
attributes of the process.193  First is whether the process allowed them to 
tell their side of the story, known as “voice.”194  The second is whether the 
authority considered their story in an unbiased and principled way, known 
as “neutrality.”195  Third is whether the authorities were seen as caring 
about the process (“trustworthiness”).196  Fourth is whether the disputant 
was treated with dignity, also known as “respect.”197  A “lack of procedural 
justice can lead to a significant sense of unfairness” in disputant’s 
minds,198 which can lead to a negative attitude about and a dissatisfaction 
with the justice system,199 and can also erode the feeling of “obligation to 
obey the law.”200 
This is particularly salient in the context of civil forfeiture, in which 
claimants, in particular, feel roughly treated,201 and would seem to lack the 
indicia of voice, trustworthiness, and even handed treatment.  As research 
has shown, however, adding a third party neutral to the dispute can help 
with all of these indicia of procedural fairness.202  Having claimants 
participate in a judicial settlement conference,203 in which the judge plays 
the role of a third party neutral,204 can allow claimants to voice their 
concerns, have them heard, and even interact with the judge in a way that 
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helps them understand the procedure of civil forfeiture,205 regardless of the 
outcome. 
B.  Creating Post-Seizure, Pre-Detention Procedure 
While ultimately the legislature at the federal or state level can help 
increase the amount of process for claimants in civil forfeiture hearings, 
the courts can, on their own, create procedure for checking the pretrial 
forfeiture of cash. 
The Second Circuit, in Krimstock v. Kelly (Krimstock V),206 created 
such a process for civil forfeiture.  In a case regarding the seizure of a 
vehicle associated with a violation of a driving-while-intoxicated statute, 
the court held “that, at a minimum, [a] hearing must enable claimants to 
test the probable validity of continued deprivation of [the property].”207  
The Seventh Circuit has also required a post-seizure hearing for continued 
deprivation of vehicles and cash.208  As one scholar has noted, these post-
seizure hearings in the context of cash forfeiture may even be required by 
due process considerations.209 
Such a post-seizure hearing of civil forfeiture cases could take many 
forms.  However, the process does not have to be demanding.  One 
proposed model suggests that this “Krimstock hearing” would “provide[] 
an adversarial process in which the claimant can contest that probable 
cause exists on three grounds: (1) whether probable cause existed for the 
offense underlying the forfeiture, (2) whether the government is likely to 
prevail in a forfeiture action, and (3) whether the government needs to 
detain the cash pending the forfeiture action.”210  This would remain a 
small burden on the government “[b]ecause law enforcement must already 
demonstrate probable cause to seize property.”211 
Even a small amount of pre-detention procedure consistent with due 
process would overcome some of the barriers to settlement considered 
above.  In particular, by creating this procedure, judges help break some 
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of the psychological barriers to settlement that may be held by either party.  
The government may not see settlement as a loss since the procedure 
provided either signals that their entitlement is not as strong as assumed 
and comes with even higher risk which may overcome some of the loss 
aversion that they are likely to feel.  In addition, the defendants are likely 
to feel that they have some access to equity and justice seeking, to have 
some sort of procedure granted to them, even without prevailing.  Most 
importantly, this reduces the lack of pre-trial resolution procedures so that 
parties are forced to come together and interact in a forum that is accessible 
for the claimant. 
C.  Encouraging Creative Settlements 
One significant advantage that a judge serving as a neutral or adding 
a mediator to the dispute can do is encourage the development of creative 
solutions to the dispute.  As noted above, the supposed zero-sum nature of 
the dispute, in which the government and the claimant are only bargaining 
over the amount of money to be returned to the claimant, can lead to a 
zero-sum mindset where parties cannot overcome impasse.212  If the 
parties’ interests are only seen as monetary, these cases are unlikely to 
resolve, even with an active judicial participant as a mediator. 
One particular creative option that could be considered is an apology 
for rough treatment on behalf of the government or law enforcement 
officers.  The power of apology has been studied extensively in other 
contexts and has been found to increase party satisfaction and encourage 
settlement.  For example, in cases of medical malpractice, an apology to 
the patient by the doctor reduced or even eliminated the demand for a cash 
award by the patient or the patient’s family.213  This is also consistent with 
our understanding of procedural justice.  As noted above, a lack of respect 
is associated with a lowered perception of procedural justice,214 and 
clearly, rough treatment at the hands of law enforcement that has been 
reported in these cases215 is perceived as a lack of respect.  Of course, an 
apology may not be the sole remedy that a claimant receives, but it is 
possible that a reduced award that meets the government interest can be 
accomplished with the use of an apology. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Civil forfeiture proceedings against pure cash holdings associated 
with suspected criminal activities are a particularly difficult type of case 
for resolution.  Structural and psychological barriers prevent parties from 
resolving these cases outside of a trial.  Without judicial intervention, these 
cases are unlikely to resolve.  As the number and amount of assets seized 
in civil forfeiture increases, we are likely to see an increase the number of 
these cases, given the incentives of both the government and defendants 
to take these cases to trial. 
This increase in cases will lead to increased docket congestion without 
proper control by judges, which is at odds with the modern managerial 
style of judging.  In order to manage their dockets appropriately, judges 
should implement particular reforms to increase the likelihood of 
settlement of these types of disputes.  In particular, judges should try to 
use judicial settlement conferences, additional pretrial procedures, and 
creative options to overcome these barriers to settlement. 
These reforms will not solve the larger issues involved in civil 
forfeiture, including individuals who have assets seized which were not 
involved in criminal activity.  However, these small reforms can help 
encourage settlement of these disputes, which will reduce docket 
congestion and allow for partial recovery of assets.  Hopefully, other 
reforms by legislators, such as reducing the incentives for forfeiture, will 
address the larger ills of the civil forfeiture system. 
 
